Abstract
Introduction
For terminals security vulnerabilities threatens to DRM (Digital Rights Management) system [1, 2] , DRM researches focus on trusted computing technology in recent years. The thesis [3] [4] [5] describe their researches about the DRM system base on trusted computing, however, none of them presents the design of authentication protocols in DRM. Actually, the authentication process of DRM server to client is a remote attestation from the client to the server in trusted computing based DRM systems. TCG specifications [6] define the remote attestation architecture, but never provide detailed protocols. In 2004, Sailer et al. [7] presents a simple remote attestation protocol, which is only a challenge & response process with a nonce. Stumpf et al. [8] showed this protocol can't resist masquerading attack, and presented another robust scheme to improve it. In addition, Tan et al. [9] presented a remote attestation protocol based on TPM, which is named TRAP and used for sensor networks. However, in these papers, there is no formal proof for protocols correctness, but only informal security analysis. This leads to these protocols have no sense for application and popularization. [10] From other angle, Goldman et al. [11] , Gasmi et al. [12] and Zhou et al. [13] separately presents their methods for combining trusted computing technology to identity authentication in TLS, in order to report integrity through trusted extended TLS channel. Similarly, Sadeghi et al. [14] described a method for extending IPSec protocol based on trusted computing. Though these protocols successfully realize transmission of integrity report with the aid of traditional security protocols, none of them is a complete trusted authentication protocol being formal proved. Based on our research [15] , the current paper not only demonstrates a trusted authentication protocol based on SDIO smart card for DRM system, but also presents its formal proof based on strand spaces model and informal security analysis.
Related Literature

Trusted Authentication in DRM
In a DRM system based on trusted authentication, DRM client should provide identity attestation and integrity report when it request data service from the DRM servers. The trusted authentication protocol is designed to ensure the peer's identity authenticity, and at the same time, complete key agreement for both sides to build a secure channel for integrity report transmission. So, the trusted authentication protocol includes three phases:
(1) Building secure channel. Through identity authentication and key agreement, both sides acknowledge each other and obtain sharing key to build secure channel for integrity report. If the authentication is failed, the connection will be terminated. (2) Integrity attestation. When identity is verified, DRM client transmit the encrypted integrity measurements with the sharing key to the server when it is requested. If the verification is failed, the connection is terminated. (3) Using secure session. When the integrity attestation is successfully done, the peer can use the built secure channel to exchange information, such as digital content or digital license. The flow of the trusted authentication between the DRM Server and client is depicted as figure 1. 
Identity Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol Based on SDIO Smart Card
SDIO smart card with its PIN can provide two-factor authentication for terminal users during remote access, which decreases illegal access without authorization and improve networks security significantly. For this reason, the multi-factor authentication technology based on SDIO smart card plays an important role in the identity authentication technology. Since Lamport [16] proposed a remote authentication scheme in 1981, many researchers have proposed new schemes to improve the efficiency and security. Chien et al. [17] proposed an efficient remote mutual authentication scheme using smart card, and claimed that the scheme requires no verification table. However, Hsu [18] showed Chien et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to the parallel session attack. Then, Juang [19] proposed another scheme preserving all the advantages of Chien et al.'s. This scheme is a nonce based protocol, not requiring synchronized clocks, and generating a session key for the user and server in their subsequent communication. However, Shieh-Wang [20] pointed out the weakness of Juang's scheme and then proposed another similar one to improve the weakness. Thereafter, Yoon-Yoo [21] showed Shieh-Wang's scheme does not provide perfect forward secrecy, and is vulnerable to a privileged insider's attack. What's more, we found Shieh-Wang's scheme is still vulnerable to parallel session attack, and can't resist the DoS (Denial of Service) attack using a stolen smart card [15] . Recently, Wang et al. [22] presented cryptanalysis and improvement on other's remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. Yang et al. [23] proposed a new scheme and a generic construction framework for smart-card-based password authentication. Xu et al. [24] presented an improved smart card based password authentication scheme with formal security proof. In 2011, Yoon [25] presented an improved scheme based on the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman problem and secure one-way hash function in order to isolate previous schemes' security problems. However, there is no formal security proof presented.
Trusted Authentication Protocol based on SDIO Smart Card
Notations
Before presenting the protocol, the notations used in the rest of the paper is listed below.
Ui：the i th DRM client; IDi : Ui's ID; PWi : Ui's password; S : DRM server; h(.) : Secure one-way hash function; x : The secret key maintained by the DRM server; ⊕: Logic Exclusive-or operation; ‖: String concatenation operation; q : A public parameter which is a large prime number; g : A public parameter which is a primitive element mod q; Nb : Nonce value generated by DRM server; Na : Nonce value generated by DRM client; Ks : Session key calculated by DRM server; Ku : Session key calculated by DRM smart card
Protocol Describe
The trusted authentication protocol based on SDIO smart card for DRM consists of four phases: the registration phase, the login phase, the identity verification and key agreement phase, and integrity attestation phase.
Registration phase: This phase is invoked whenever a user Ui initially registers to a remote server S.
(1) Ui selects his identifier IDi and password PWi, and submits h(PWi) to the remote server over a secure channel. (2) Upon receiving the registration request, S computes Ri=h(IDi⊕x) ⊕h(PWi), Ci= h(h(IDi x)) h(PWi), and issues Ui a smart card containing Ri, Ci and h(.). Login phase: this phase occurs when the user wants to login the remote server each time.
(1) Ui inserts his smart card into the smart card reader of a terminal, and enters his IDi and PWi. If no response is received in time or the response is incorrect, report login failure to the client and stop the session. Identity verification and key agreement phase: this phase is invoked whenever S receives Ui's login request. After receiving the message (IDi, DHC 1 , MAC 1 ) from Ui, S performs the following steps to assure the integrity of the message, respond to Ui and challenge Ui:
(1) Firstly, check the integrity of the message by the following computing: ai′= h(IDi⊕x)， 2 ) from S, the smart card performs the following steps to authenticate S and respond to S's challenge, and then computes the sharing session key.
(1) Firstly, authenticate S by the following computing: ai=Ri ⊕ h(PWi ),
). If MAC 2 ′= MAC 2 , the server is trusted and the latter process will be continued. Or , the smart will inform the client that login is failed, and stop the session. When the identity authentication and key agreement phase is completed, the DRM server and the client can use the session key Ku (=Ks) to encrypt the session data in the latter communications. The message alternation process in the above two phases is illustrated in Figure 2 . Integrity attestation phase: this phase occurs when the secure session channel is built. The following process is the remote attestation of TCG. [6] (1) The server S sends integrity request together with a nonce to the client Ui. The nonce is sent in order to resist the replay attack. (2) After receiving the request, the client obtains Quote=Sign{PCRs}PK AIK , which is the PCRs value signed by AIK public key from TPM. Then, (3) The client computes EM= Encrypt{PCRs, Quote, SML, nonce } Ks , and returns EM to the server. (4) The server decrypt the EM from client with Ks (=Ku), and get nonce, PCRs value, Quote and SML. (5) The server checks nonce to certify the message's freshness, and validates AIK certification to certify the AIK secure keys are valid. Then, the server use AIK's public key to attest the Quote is valid. If all these are trusted, the server will check the PCRs value and SML to make sure whether the client's configuration is trusted. (6) If the integrity of the client is certified to be right, the server will start the digital content sharing with the client or distributing digital license to it. Or, the server will stop the connection. The process of this phase is illustrated as the following figure 3. By now, the whole trusted authentication protocol for DRM system is completed. Specially, the presented scheme above allows DRM client users to change password freely and securely without remote server's help. Concretely, when Ui wants to change his password PWi with a new one, for example PWi*, the following steps will be performed:
(1) Ui inserts his smart card into the smart card reader of a terminal, and enters his IDi and PWi; (2) The smart card firstly check the validity of the password by computing Ci′= h(Ri h(PWi)) h(PWi) and checking whether Ci′=Ci. If PWi is valid, user is permitted to enter the new password PWi*. Otherwise, smart card rejects user's password change request. 
Formal Security Proof Based on Strand Spaces
Strand spaces theory is a formal analysis method for security protocol, being presented by Fabrega, Herzog and Guttman. [26, 27] A Strand space is a collection of strands, equipped with a graph structure generated by causal interaction. In this framework, protocol correctness claims may be expressed in terms of the connections between strands of different kinds. Strand spaces model strictly standardizes authorized entity's behaviors, attacker's ability and operating environment. It can correctly describe the sequence and consequence of actions during the protocol process, and provide an effective analysis theory for protocol formal analysis.
In this section, we present the formal proof for the protocol based on the strand spaces theory. The correlative definitions and propositions of the basic strand spaces model can be referred to the references [26, 27] .
The Extension of Strand Spaces
The trusted authentication protocol is designed based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange, and is not able to be described and analyzed by the basic strand spaces model. Therefore, we will extend the model for our protocol's formal analysis. (1) Correspondence property: The both sides in the authentication protocol computes sharing secrets h(ID⊕x), and uses it to do exclusive-or operation with DH value. Meanwhile, they use hash function h(.) to operate message authentication, and then generating a same session key.
(2) Secrete property: The both sides can obtain NaNb g , which can't be computed by the penetrator. Then, the strand space of the presented protocol is denoted as (∑, P) = ∑ init ∪∑ resp ∪P, where P is the set of penetrator strands. The strand space model of the protocol is illustrated as the figure 4. By now, we have proved the responder's correspondence property. And, in a similar way, the initiator's can be proved, too. That is, the correspondence property of the protocol is proved.
Formal Proof for the Trusted Authentication Protocol
Secrecy
For being based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement, the protocol's secrecy is guaranteed by the secrecy of DH. 
, which is in contradiction to the above conclusion that it originates in < p, 2>.
To sum up, all the terms containing 
Informal Security Analysis
In fact, the security of the proposed trusted authentication protocol is guaranteed by its mutual authentication and key agreement phase. If this phase is completed securely, the sharing session key can protect the following integrity attestation. So, in this section, we firstly examine the security of the proposed mutual authentication and key agreement scheme using SDIO smart card from the following aspect.
(1) The proposed protocol resists the privileged insider's attack. In the registration phase, h(PWi) is submitted, instead of submitting password in plain text form. Thus, the privileged insider of the server can't obtain the password. Therefore, the scheme can withstand the privileged insider's attack.
(2) The proposed protocol resists the replay attack. The authentication is based on challenge and response, which decides that a replay attack can't pass the subsequent challenges.
(3) The proposed protocol resists parallel session attack. The parallel session attack is impossible to occur because the challenge values of the both sides never appear in plain text form during the whole authentication process. An attacker can't acquire any valid message to masquerade a legal user or a remote server.
(4) The proposed protocol resists guessing attack. It resists online guessing attack because entering wrong password is limited to three in the system. For the offline guessing attacks, even if the attacker get Ri = h(IDi x) h(PWi) stored in the smart card, he can't obtain the IDi or PWi because of the protection of Hash.
(5) The proposed protocol provides fast wrong password detection. If user Ui inputs the wrong password by mistake, this wrong password will be quickly detected by the smart card since the smart card can verify Ci′= h(Ri h(PWi )) h(PWi) using the stored Ci in the login phase and stop the following information exchange in time.
(6) The proposed protocol provides secure password change. Because the smart card verifies the old password firstly in the password change phase, when a smart card is stolen, unauthorized users can't change the password of the card. Thus, no one can perform the Denial of Service attack using a stolen card.
(7) The proposed protocol provides perfect forward secrecy. The key agreement of the proposed scheme uses Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme, which is well known to be able to provide perfect forward secrecy.
(8) The proposed protocol has no time synchronization problem. The scheme uses random numbers, not time stamp to be the challenge values. So, there is no time synchronization problem.
(9) The proposed protocol has integrity attestation. In the scheme, not only the identity but also the integrity of the user is authenticated by the server. This guarantees the terminal security in a DRM system.
(10) The proposed protocol's correctness has been formally proved. As demonstrated in the section 4, the protocol was proved to be correct using strand spaces theory.
Here, we compare its security properties with the other related protocols [20, 22, 23, 24, 25] . Table 1 shows the comparison results. 
Performance Comparisons
This section analyzes the efficiency of the proposed protocol. Table 2 provides computational costs of the proposed protocol with the above five protocols in regards to the registration, login, authentication and key agreement. Here we consider notation T h , T A , T MA and T ME as the computational cost of one way hash function, asymmetric encryption, modular addition, and modular exponentiation, respectively. As in table 1 and table 2 , we can see that the proposed protocol not only provides more security assurances, but also has the reasonable computational costs. What's more, the proposed protocol is formally proved to be secure, and is the only one that provides integrity attestation.
Conclusion and Future Prospects
This paper demonstrated a trusted authentication protocol for DRM system based on mutual authentication and key agreement scheme using SDIO smart card. Together with the protocol, a strict formal proof was presented, too. What's more, in contrast to other corrective schemes through attack resisting analysis and computational cost analysis, the proposed scheme is able to provide greater security and practicality.
